Liminal Diplomacy at the Poles: Japan’s Disaster Risk Reduction and the Making of Arctic Order

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Japan’s former Arctic Ambassador, Keizo Takewaka, delivering a speech at the 2022 Arctic Circle Assembly held October 13–16 in Reykjavík, Iceland. Photo: Arctic Circle Assembly

The Arctic Institute Japan Series 2026

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The Arctic has reemerged as a dynamic yet unsettled governance arena.¹⁾Khorrami N (2025) The future of Arctic governance in a fractured geopolitical landscape. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 14 October 2025, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2025/10/14/the-future-of-arctic-governance-in-a-fractured-geopolitical-landscape/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Rapid warming is reshaping ecologies, opening maritime routes, and unlocking resources while geopolitics has hardened due to Russia’s Arctic militarization, China’s ‘near-Arctic’ posture, and both the U.S. and NATO’s heightened attention to, and presence in, the region.²⁾Faulconbridge G & Kelly L (2024) Russian Navy starts major drills involving most of its fleet. Reuters, 30 July, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-navy-starts-drills-involving-20000-personnel-300-ships-2024-07-30/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; The State Council Information Office of the PRC (2018) Full text: China’s Arctic Policy. The State Council Information Office of the PRC, 26 January, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Pompeo MR (2019) Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus. U.S. Department of State, 6 May, https://2017-2021.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; NATO Allied Command Transformation (2023) The Future of the High North. NATO Allied Command Transformation, https://www.act.nato.int/article/the-future-of-the-high-north/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Yet regional institutions remain circumscribed with the Arctic Council excluding military security discussions and UNCLOS leaving key delimitation questions open. In this context, the Arctic is a liminal domain where rules, roles, and boundaries are unsettled, creating risks and openings for influence.³⁾Arctic Council (n.d.) About the Arctic Council. Arctic Council, https://arctic-council.org/about/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2023) UNCLOS overview: Sovereignty and UNCLOS. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/hydrography-hydrographie/unclos/index-eng.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Amid this evolving landscape, Japan has positioned itself as an active participant despite being a non-Arctic state with no sovereign claims in the region.⁴⁾Arctic Council (2013) Approval of applications for Arctic Council Observers. Arctic Council, https://arctic-council.org/news/approval-of-applications-for-arctic-council-observers/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Backed by its observer status in the Arctic Council and its 2015 Arctic Policy, Tokyo has focused on non-military initiatives such as scientific research, environmental stewardship, sustainable resource use, and most interestingly disaster risk reduction (DRR) and emergency preparedness.⁵⁾Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2015) Japan’s Arctic Policy. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/arctic/pdf/japans_ap_e.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2023) The Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/plan/pdf/plan04_gaiyou_e.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Although Japan’s contributions may appear technocratic or apolitical, this article makes the case that they constitute a strategic practice of middle-power liminal diplomacy by an ‘established’ middle power.⁶⁾Pham K (2024) Japan Steps Up Its Arctic Engagement. The Arctic Institute, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/japan-steps-up-arctic-engagement/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Nye JS (2014) The Information Revolution and Soft Power. Harvard DASH, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstreams/7312037c-f2c2-6bd4-e053-0100007fdf3b/download. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Policy Center for the New South (2025) Shaping a New World? Middle Powers and Global Governance. Policy Center for the New South, https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/shaping-new-world-middle-powers-and-global-governance. Accessed on 30 January 2026 More specifically, it demonstrates how DRR functions as a vehicle for embedding Japan in Arctic governance, building trust, and projecting norms of cooperation and transparency in a contested space; patterned practices through which it stabilizes meanings, embeds norms, and shapes emerging orders under conditions of ambiguity.

Japan’s Arctic DRR Practices

Japan’s Arctic DRR diplomacy stems from its domestic trajectory of resilience-building. Repeated natural disasters have made disaster governance a national priority since the 1961 Basic Act on Disaster Management and the establishment of the Central Disaster Prevention Council.⁷⁾National Land Agency (1961) Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. Asian Disaster Reduction Center, https://www.adrc.asia/documents/law/DisasterCountermeasuresBasicAct.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Events like the 1995 Hanshin and 2011 Tohoku disasters embedded resilience in Japan’s policy identity, transforming DRR from a domestic imperative into a foreign policy asset. The 2013 Basic Act on National Resilience, for instance, framed it as both a security measure and an avenue for international cooperation, positioning Japan as a state whose political identity is intertwined with resilience.⁸⁾Cabinet Secretariat (2013) Basic Act for National Resilience. Japanese Law Translation, https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/2354/en. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Engagement in the Arctic: The Arctic Council, bilateral and minilateral partnerships

Japan gained Arctic Council observer status in 2013 after decades of polar research and diplomatic engagement. Beyond its 2015 Arctic Policy, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy remains the key framework for Japan’s Arctic strategy.⁹⁾Cabinet Secretariat (2013) Ocean Policy. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (Ocean Policy portal), https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/index_e.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026 The Second Plan (2013) emphasized scientific observation, cooperation, and the possible utilization and development of the Arctic Sea Route in concert with relevant countries, while the Fourth (2023) marked a shift toward a proactive Arctic role, calling for stronger observation technologies, a new icebreaker due in 2026, and expanded research under the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability III (ArCS III).¹⁰⁾Cabinet Secretariat (2013) Basic Act for National Resilience. Japanese Law Translation, https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/2354/en. Accessed on 30 January 2026; JAMSTEC (n.d.) Arctic Research Vessel project (Mirai II / ARV) overview. JAMSTEC, https://www.jamstec.go.jp/parv/e/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; MarineLink (2025) JAMSTEC launches Japan’s first Arctic research vessel (Mirai II). MarineLink, https://www.marinelink.com/news/jamstec-launches-japans-first-arctic-523724. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Maritime Executive (2025) Japan launches dedicated ice-class Arctic research vessel. Maritime Executive, https://maritime-executive.com/article/japan-launches-its-first-dedicated-ice-class-arctic-research-vessel. Accessed on 30 January 2026

The 2023 Plan also accentuates Japan’s normative and diplomatic alignment with the principles of international law and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. Within this framework, Japan has used DRR as a distinct niche to exercise agency and proactively engaging with the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR) working group, an Arctic Council Expert Group, as the main mechanism for coordinating environmental and industrial emergency response. It also contributes to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) through ArCS programs, providing satellite data, multilateral exercises, and expertise on earthquake and tsunami preparedness.¹¹⁾AMAP (n.d.) Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. AMAP (Arctic Council), https://www.amap.no/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; PAME (n.d.) Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment. PAME (Arctic Council), https://www.pame.is/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; SDWG (n.d.) Sustainable Development Working Group. SDWG (Arctic Council), https://sdwg.org/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 These contributions allow Tokyo to signal reliability, demonstrate cooperative leadership, and embed itself in the governance of a region where it has no territorial claims but growing normative influence.

Japan also frames its Arctic Council interventions around shared vulnerability rather than competition. By emphasizing transboundary risks such as oil spills or climate-induced disasters, it aligns with the Council’s cooperative ethos and performs a middle-power identity grounded in trust and restraint.¹²⁾Arctic Council (2011) Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR Agreement). Arctic Council (OAArchive), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Council (2013) Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA). Arctic Council, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/ee4c9907-7270-41f6-b681-f797fc81659f. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Beyond the Council, Japan strengthens its Arctic DRR role through bilateral and minilateral partnerships. With Norway, cooperation spans research, observation, and environmental monitoring via institutions such as the Norwegian Polar Institute and the University Centre in Svalbard; initiatives that are further reinforced through frameworks such as the ArCS framework.¹³⁾Norwegian Polar Institute (n.d.) About NPI. Norwegian Polar Institute, https://www.npolar.no/en/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; University Centre in Svalbard (n.d.) About UNIS. UNIS, https://www.unis.no/about/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Frontiers (n.d.) Conference overview. Arctic Frontiers, https://www.arcticfrontiers.com/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 With Iceland, Japan launched its first Arctic Policy at the Assembly in Reykjavík in 2015 and later co-hosted the Third Arctic Science Ministerial in 2021, followed by the Arctic Circle Japan Forum in 2023.¹⁴⁾ASM3 Secretariat (2021) Joint Statement of Ministers—Third Arctic Science Ministerial (Tokyo). ASM3 Secretariat, https://asm3.org/library/Files/ASM3_Joint_Statement.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; ASM3 Secretariat (2021) Final Report—Knowledge for a Sustainable Arctic. ASM3 Secretariat, https://asm3.org/library/Files/ASM3_Final_Report.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Circle (2023) Arctic Circle Japan Forum (Tokyo, March 2023). Arctic Circle, https://www.arcticcircle.org/forums/arctic-circle-japan-forum. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Sasakawa Peace Foundation (OPRI) (2023) Arctic Circle Japan Forum—event page. Sasakawa Peace Foundation, https://www.spf.org/opri/en/event/20230304.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026; European Polar Board (2023) Arctic Circle Japan Forum—listing. European Polar Board, https://www.europeanpolarboard.org/events/arctic-circle-japan-forum/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 In Canada, collaboration focuses on early-warning systems and emergency response through the Polar Knowledge Canada partnership.¹⁵⁾Polar Knowledge Canada (POLAR) (n.d.) About POLAR Knowledge Canada. Government of Canada, https://www.canada.ca/en/polar-knowledge/behindthescenes.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026 The U.S.–Japan alliance also provides a channel for Arctic engagement, including joint exercises like Northern Viper and satellite data exchanges for disaster monitoring and situational awareness.¹⁶⁾U.S. Marine Corps (2020) US, Japan launch Exercise Northern Viper (Hokkaido). U.S. Marine Corps, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2067324/us-japan-launch-exercise-northern-viper/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (2020) Northern Viper 2020 comes to an end (cold-weather training). U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/2079837/cold-training-warm-farewell-as-exercise-northern-viper-2020-comes-to-an-end/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; DVIDS (n.d.) Northern Viper (exercise feature portal). DVIDS, https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/NorthernViper. Accessed on 30 January 2026 These partnerships exemplify coalition-building typical of middle powers, embedding Japan within trusted networks and reinforcing its legitimacy through technocratic expertise rather than territorial presence.

Technology and science diplomacy

Arguably, the most significant instrument of Japan’s Arctic DRR diplomacy is its technological capability. Through the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), Japan has positioned itself as an indispensable contributor to Arctic observation and maritime safety. For instance, JAXA’s Global Change Observation Mission – Water (“SHIZUKU,” GCOM-W) and Global Change Observation Mission – Climate (“SHIKISAI,” GCOM-C) satellites monitor sea-ice extent across the entire Arctic Ocean, offering crucial indicators of global warming and navigational risk.¹⁷⁾JAXA Earth (n.d.) Sea Ice (product overview—GCOM-W/C). JAXA, https://earth.jaxa.jp/en/data/products/sea-ice/index.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026; JAXA Global (n.d.) GCOM-W (SHIZUKU) mission. JAXA, https://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/gcom_w/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Additionally, Tokyo has developed advanced satellite systems, such as the Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS), the Himawari series, the Greenhouse Gases Observing Satellite (GOSAT) programme and its follow-up GOSAT-GW, which provide high-resolution imagery for monitoring long and short term weather scans, greenhouse gases, water-cycle changes, natural disasters, ice coverage, cloud–aerosol–radiation interactions, and maritime traffic.¹⁸⁾eoPortal (n.d.) ALOS-2 (PALSAR-2) mission overview. eoPortal, https://www.eoportal.org/satellite-missions/alos-2. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) (n.d.) Himawari series (next-generation geostationary satellites). JMA, https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/jma-eng/satellite/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; JAXA Global (n.d.) GOSAT (IBUKI) mission. JAXA, https://www.jaxa.jp/countdown/f15/overview/ibuki_e.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026; JAXA SatNavi (n.d.) GOSAT-GW (IBUKI-GW) mission page. JAXA, https://www.satnavi.jaxa.jp/files/project/gosat-gw/en/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; JAXA (2025) GOSAT-GW critical operations phase completed (press release). JAXA, 1 July, https://global.jaxa.jp/press/2025/07/20250701-1_e.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026 These assets have been mobilized for Arctic monitoring, complementing domestic efforts by Arctic states and bolstering global situational awareness.¹⁹⁾JAXA EORC (n.d.) AMSR Cryosphere data catalog (sea-ice concentration/drift). JAXA EORC, https://www.eorc.jaxa.jp/AMSR/datacatalog/cryosphere/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Japan Coast Guard (n.d.) Ice Information Center (Okhotsk / Hokkaido). Japan Coast Guard, https://www1.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/KAN1/drift_ice/1center_eng.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Japan has also invested in earth observation research with Arctic applications, collaborating with universities and research institutes on polar climate modeling and environmental risk assessment particularly through institutional participants of ArCS iterations and its own National Institute of Polar Research. These scientific initiatives serve the dual purpose of contributing to the global understanding of Arctic risks while also projecting Japan’s identity as a responsible scientific actor. In addition, Japan has participated in search-and-rescue (SAR) exercises under the Arctic Council framework. As an observer, Tokyo participates in the EPPR working group and related SAR Expert Group activities, contributing technical input and lessons from its national disaster-response system. Japan’s involvement has included participation in EPPR-SAR tabletop exercises (e.g., Arctic Guardian 2021) and workshops on radiation-response coordination (EPPR 2021, Reykjavik).²⁰⁾Arctic Council—Senior Arctic Officials (2021) Report to Ministers (notes Arctic Guardian TTX). UArctic (document repository), https://www.uarctic.org/media/1601862/mmis12_2021_reykjavik_saortm-final-draft-1.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; The Barents Observer (2021) Arctic Guardian 2021 underway—joint emergency response. The Barents Observer, https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/arctic-guardian-exercise-2021-underway-to-test-joint-emergency-marine-response/139397. Accessed on 30 January 2026; EPPR (2019–2021) Radiation Expert Group & workshops (Reykjavík 2019/2021). EPPR, https://eppr.org/expert-groups/radiation/. Accessed on 30 January 2026. These engagements, together with Japan’s Coast Guard cooperation with U.S. and Norwegian counterparts and support for the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, demonstrate how Japan leverages its disaster-management experience to strengthen Arctic risk-governance and safety architectures.²¹⁾Arctic Council (2011) Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR Agreement). Arctic Council (OAArchive), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531. Accessed on 30 January 2026; EPPR (n.d.) Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (mandate, expert groups). EPPR, https://eppr.org/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Council—Senior Arctic Officials (2021) Report to Ministers (notes Arctic Guardian TTX). UArctic (document repository), https://www.uarctic.org/media/1601862/mmis12_2021_reykjavik_saortm-final-draft-1.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; The Barents Observer (2021) Arctic Guardian 2021 underway—joint emergency response. The Barents Observer, https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/arctic-guardian-exercise-2021-underway-to-test-joint-emergency-marine-response/139397. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Taken together, these practices illustrate how DRR has evolved from a technocratic contribution into a strategic instrument of Japan’s Arctic diplomacy. What began as functional cooperation on satellite monitoring, environmental observation, and emergency preparedness has developed into a repertoire of diplomatic performances that stabilize meanings and institutionalize Japan’s presence within Arctic governance as a reliable middle power committed to cooperative risk governance and avoiding direct entanglement in the sovereignty disputes or military securitization that dominate Arctic geopolitics.

Japan’s DRR as Liminal Diplomacy in the Arctic

Given the depth and longevity of Japan’s engagement with and contribution to Arctic DRR, it appears reasonable to assert that Tokyo’s DRR activities go above and beyond mere technical cooperation an instead they represent a coherent and patterned diplomatic endeavour that align with the mechanisms of liminal diplomacy: stabilizing meaning in an ambiguous environment, embedding norms in institutions, and governing risks to build legitimacy.²²⁾Adler E & Pouliot V (2011) International Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bueger C & Gadinger F (2015) International Practice Theory. Palgrave Macmillan.

Meaning stabilization: Framing DRR as a shared good

One of the central features of liminal diplomacy is the capacity to stabilize meanings in domains where categories and rules are unsettled. In the Arctic, sovereignty claims overlap, governance frameworks are incomplete, and military-security issues intersect with environmental and human security.²³⁾United Nations (1982) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations, 10 December 1982, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Council (n.d.) Working Groups / About (mandates; AC excludes military security). Arctic Council, https://arctic-council.org/about/working-groups/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; AMAP (2021) Arctic Climate Change Update 2021: Key Trends and Impacts. AMAP (Arctic Council), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/952ce558-b096-458c-9bed-89e1cc9129ba/content. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Against this backdrop, Japan’s DRR practices help frame the region not merely as a theatre of strategic rivalry but as a site of shared vulnerability.

Japan consistently invokes the language of resilience and preparedness in its Arctic contributions. Read in context, these terms can be understood as resonating with Japan’s domestic identity as a disaster-resilient society while simultaneously presenting DRR as a cooperative good that transcends geopolitical divides. This framing appears consistently in Japan’s first iteration of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2013) wherein disaster control is emphasized alongside search and rescue (SAR) and oil spill response under the overarching aegis of maintaining order and security at sea and developing measures and mechanisms to address “changes in the Arctic Ocean caused by climate change.”²⁴⁾Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2013) Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (Second). Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (Ocean Policy portal), https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/arctic/arcticpolicy_e.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Similarly, Japan’s 2015 Arctic Policy explicitly describes the Arctic as a “vulnerable and low resilient” environment and positions Japan as a leading actor in “sustainable development in the Arctic…with foresight and policy based on science and technology”.²⁵⁾Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2015) Japan’s Arctic Policy. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/arctic/pdf/japans_ap_e.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026. Subsequent revisions of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2018, 2023) expand his narrative, highlighting the creation of safe environments for navigation and cooperation with industry and research institutions on risk mitigation especially as means to enhance Japan’s presence “by resolving global challenges through promotion of observation and research, active participation in the formulation of international rules and the promotion of international cooperation.”²⁶⁾Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2018) Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (Third). Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (Ocean Policy portal), https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/arctic/arcticpolicy_e.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2023) The Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/plan/pdf/plan04_gaiyou_e.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026

In parallel, domestic legislation, such as the Basic Act for National Resilience (2013) and its follow-up strategies, provide a policy vocabulary that resonate in Arctic fora, while programs such as ArCS embed resilience into Japan’s scientific diplomacy. Ministerial statements at the Arctic Circle Assembly (2018) and co-hosting of the Third Arctic Science Ministerial (2021), moreover, further consolidate this framing and depict both DRR and scientific cooperation as Japan’s core contributions to Arctic governance.²⁷⁾Cabinet Secretariat (2013) Basic Act for National Resilience. Japanese Law Translation, https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/2354/en. Accessed on 30 January 2026; National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) (n.d.) ArCS II – Arctic Challenge for Sustainability II. NIPR, https://www.nipr.ac.jp/arcs2/e/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Environment Research Center (2025) A new national Arctic research initiative, ArCS III (Arctic Challenge for Sustainability III), was officially launched. NIPR/AERC, 11 April, https://www.nipr.ac.jp/aerc/e/info/20250411.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Circle (2018) Keynote—Foreign Minister Taro Kono (program/remarks). Arctic Circle, https://www.arcticcircle.org/assemblies. Accessed on 30 January 2026; ASM3 Secretariat (2021) Joint Statement of Ministers—Third Arctic Science Ministerial (Tokyo). ASM3 Secretariat, https://asm3.org/library/Files/ASM3_Joint_Statement.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; ASM3 Secretariat (2021) Final Report—Knowledge for a Sustainable Arctic. ASM3 Secretariat, https://asm3.org/library/Files/ASM3_Final_Report.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Interestingly, this discourse aligns closely with the EPPR’s Strategic Plan (2021–2030) which defines its core mission as enhancing Arctic resilience and cooperative emergency response.²⁸⁾EPPR (2021) Strategic Plan 2021–2030. EPPR Japan’s space-based contributions, particularly satellite data and technical expertise cited in EPPR annual reports, help reinforce this institutional vocabulary.

By consistently framing disaster risk reduction (DRR) as an apolitical, transboundary public good that protects both human communities and ecosystems, Japan not only reshapes the meaning of risk—shifting it from a securitized, national-interest perspective to one of shared responsibility—but also enhances its legitimacy and credibility as an observer state and as a trustworthy partner in the collective management of Arctic vulnerabilities and the co-production of an emerging Arctic order.

Institutional embedding: Consolidating presence through routines

A second mechanism of liminal diplomacy is the embedding of practices into institutional routines. Japan’s observer status in the Arctic Council might seem peripheral compared to the voting powers of the eight member states. Through steady participation in working groups, knowledge production, and project co-financing, Tokyo has nonetheless maintained a meaningful and influential presence.²⁹⁾Arctic Council (n.d.) Observer: Japan. Arctic Council, https://arctic-council.org/about/observers/japan/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Council (2016) Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies / Rules of Procedure. Arctic Council (OAArchive), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/ead1bb3b-8189-4cab-8eee-a78e01d21789. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Within this architecture, EPPR, which constitutes Japan’s primary DRR venue, illuminates this process the best. Japanese agencies first joined EPPR in 2019 (Japan Coast Guard at EPPR-I Bodø; Cabinet Office at EPPR-II Reykjavík) and delivered a briefing on nuclear emergency preparedness and Japan’s legal framework for nuclear emergencies informed by lessons learnt from the Fukushima disaster.³⁰⁾EPPR (n.d.) Radiation Expert Group (mandate; activities). EPPR, https://eppr.org/expert-groups/radiation/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 EPPR’s work now runs through three standing Expert Groups: Search and Rescue (2015), Marine Environmental Response, and Radiation (established at EPPR-II Reykjavík, 3–5 Dec 2019), providing observer nations like Japan recurring, technical entry points aligned with DRR.³¹⁾EPPR (n.d.) Radiation Expert Group (mandate; activities). EPPR, https://eppr.org/expert-groups/radiation/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; EPPR (2017) The EPPR Search and Rescue (SAR) Expert Group. EPPR, https://eppr.org/news/the-eppr-search-and-rescue-sar-expert-group/. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Japan’s value added in these endeavors is technical; mainly through satellite data contribution such as sea-ice and related Earth-observation products provided by JAXA, participation in joint exercises, and drafting risk management guidelines.³²⁾JAXA Earth (n.d.) Sea Ice products overview (GCOM-W/C). JAXA, https://earth.jaxa.jp/en/data/products/sea-ice/index.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026; eoPortal (n.d.) ALOS-2 (PALSAR-2) mission overview. eoPortal, https://www.eoportal.org/satellite-missions/alos-2. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Japan Coast Guard (n.d.) Ice Information Center (Okhotsk / Hokkaido). Japan Coast Guard, https://www1.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/KAN1/drift_ice/1center_eng.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Institutional embedding also proceeds via bilateral and minilateral science frameworks that loop back into Working Group pipelines. For example, Japan has recently formalized a Memorandum on Reciprocal Research Cooperation between JST and the Research Council of Norway (2025), and their STC Agreement’s joint committee met in 2024 with polar research on the agenda, both mechanisms that facilitate co-funded Arctic projects feeding AMAP, PAME and EPPR workflows.³³⁾Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) (2025) Memorandum on Reciprocal Research Cooperation—JST and the Research Council of Norway. JST, https://www.jst.go.jp/EN/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; ASM3 Secretariat (2021) Joint Statement of Ministers—Third Arctic Science Ministerial (Tokyo). ASM3 Secretariat, https://asm3.org/library/Files/ASM3_Joint_Statement.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; ASM3 Secretariat (2021) Final Report—Knowledge for a Sustainable Arctic. ASM3 Secretariat, https://asm3.org/library/Files/ASM3_Final_Report.pdf. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Embassy of Japan in Canada (2016) Signing of the Letter of Understanding Concerning Polar Research Cooperation. Embassy of Japan in Canada, 6 June, https://www.ca.emb-japan.go.jp/canada_e/Bilateral_Relations/Polar_Research_Cooperation.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Together with Iceland, moreover, Japan co-hosted the ASM3 in Tokyo in 2021; an intergovernmental forum designed to align research and data sharing thereby enabling Japan to curate agenda-setting on resilience and preparedness.

Finally, Japan institutionalizes its contributions domestically through ArCS II (since 2020) and ArCS III (since 2025). These are flagship, internationalized Arctic research programs that finance Japanese participation in Arctic Council Working Groups and operate the Arctic Data Archive System (ADS). Together, they constitute a steady pipeline of expertise, data, and deliverables feeding into Arctic Council–relevant processes and procedures.³⁴⁾National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) (n.d.) ArCS II – Arctic Challenge for Sustainability II. NIPR, https://www.nipr.ac.jp/arcs2/e/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Environment Research Center (2025) A new national Arctic research initiative, ArCS III (Arctic Challenge for Sustainability III), was officially launched. NIPR/AERC, 11 April, https://www.nipr.ac.jp/aerc/e/info/20250411.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026; National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) (n.d.) Arctic Data archive System (ADS). NIPR, https://ads.nipr.ac.jp/. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Risk governance: Legitimacy through vulnerability management

The third mechanism of liminal diplomacy operates through the management of risks that, when shared, generate legitimacy. In the Arctic, hazards are multi-scalar, ranging from sea-ice and permafrost degradation to oil-spill response, maritime accidents, and radiological or industrial emergencies, each of which transcends national jurisdictions. DRR provides Japan with an apolitical yet deeply strategic avenue for cooperation: a field where expertise can be shared without contesting sovereignty or military prerogatives.³⁵⁾AMAP (2021) Arctic Climate Change Update 2021: Key Trends and Impacts. AMAP (Arctic Council), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/952ce558-b096-458c-9bed-89e1cc9129ba/content. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Japan’s technological contributions illustrate how risk governance becomes diplomacy by other means. Through the JAXA, satellites such as ALOS-2, GCOM-W “SHIZUKU,” and GCOM-C “SHIKISAI” conduct near-daily observations of the Arctic, producing terabytes of data on sea-ice concentration, surface temperature, and ocean color.³⁶⁾Arctic Council (2013) Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA). Arctic Council (OAArchive), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/ee4c9907-7270-41f6-b681-f797fc81659f. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Council (2011) Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR Agreement). Arctic Council (OAArchive), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/9c343a3f-cc4b-4e75-bfd3-4b318137f8a2. Accessed on 30 January 2026. These datasets feed directly into the Japan Coast Guard’s Ice Information Center, which compiles and publishes weekly Sea-Ice Reports for the Sea of Okhotsk and the Northern Sea Route.³⁷⁾JAXA Earth (n.d.) Sea Ice products overview (GCOM-W/C). JAXA, https://earth.jaxa.jp/en/data/products/sea-ice/index.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026; JAXA Global (n.d.) GCOM-W (SHIZUKU) mission. JAXA, https://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/gcom_w/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; JAXA Global (n.d.) GCOM-C (SHIKISAI) mission. JAXA, https://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/gcom_c/. Accessed on 30 January 2026. JAXA also provides ALOS-2 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery for winter navigation safety, a service routinely used by domestic shipping operators and Arctic partners.³⁸⁾Japan Coast Guard (n.d.) Ice Information Center (Okhotsk / Hokkaido). Japan Coast Guard, https://www1.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/KAN1/drift_ice/1center_eng.html. Accessed on 30 January 2026. In 2020, these satellite products were officially listed under the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy Implementation Report as part of Japan’s Arctic monitoring and climate-adaptation measures.³⁹⁾eoPortal (n.d.) ALOS-2 (PALSAR-2) mission overview. eoPortal, https://www.eoportal.org/satellite-missions/alos-2. Accessed on 30 January 2026

Japan’s risk governance practices, however, extend beyond observation to operational preparedness. Since 2019, Japanese representatives from the Cabinet Office and Japan Coast Guard have participated in the Arctic Council’s EPPR meetings and the SAR Expert Group established under the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime SAR in the Arctic.⁴⁰⁾Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2020) Basic Plan on Ocean Policy—Implementation Report (Arctic monitoring & satellite observation sections). Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/. Accessed on 30 January 2026 Japan presented on nuclear emergency preparedness in Reykjavík (EPPR-II, 2019) and has since contributed to EPPR–SAR tabletop exercises such as Arctic Guardian 2021, sharing insights derived from post-Fukushima nuclear response and inter-agency coordination.⁴¹⁾Arctic Council (2019) Arctic Council SAO plenary meeting 20–21 November 2019, Hveragerði, Iceland. Arctic Council (OAArchive), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/d04a6a10-cff6-4a01-a868-de86e2205fb0/content. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Council/EPPR (2017) The EPPR Search and Rescue (SAR) Expert Group. EPPR, https://eppr.org/news/the-eppr-search-and-rescue-sar-expert-group/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Council (2011) Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR Agreement). Arctic Council (OAArchive), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531. Accessed on 30 January 2026 These engagements may appear routine, but their repetition embeds Japan within the procedural infrastructure of Arctic safety governance.

Domestically, Japan’s National Resilience (Kyōjinka) Policy codifies an inter-ministerial framework for managing compound risks (earthquakes, tsunamis, nuclear accidents) that directly inform the technocratic culture that has since been exported to Arctic DRR. The Basic Act on National Resilience and its annual Cabinet Secretariat reports emphasize international cooperation in disaster management, including data-sharing and early warning, which have been integrated into Arctic programs such as ArCS II (2020–2025) and ArCS III (2025-2030).⁴²⁾EPPR (n.d.) Radiation Expert Group (mandate; activities). EPPR, https://eppr.org/expert-groups/radiation/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; Arctic Council/EPPR (2021) EPPR Ministerial Deliverables for the Arctic Council Reykjavík 2021 Ministerial Meeting. EPPR, https://eppr.org/news/min-deliverables-21/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; The Barents Observer (2021) Arctic Guardian 2021 underway—joint emergency marine response. The Barents Observer, https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/arctic-guardian-exercise-2021-underway-to-test-joint-emergency-marine-response/139397. Accessed on 30 January 2026 This multi-institutional, nationally funded initiative unites many Japanese institutions, including NIPR, JAMSTEC, and JAXA, to conduct integrated environmental risk assessments, resilience modelling, and human–natural system studies in the Arctic.

Through these interconnected practices Japan has expertly transformed domestic vulnerability into diplomatic authority. The disasters that once exposed its fragility now constitute epistemic capital, enabling Tokyo to act as a resilience specialist within Arctic governance, and particularly the governance of uncertainty.

Japan’s niche in the Arctic order

From participation in EPPR and SAR exercises to the operation of Arctic-observation satellites and the institutionalization of Arctic research through ArCS iterations, these practices illustrate how Japan leverages liminal diplomacy to carve a functional niche in Arctic governance. Unlike China, which promotes its identity as a “near-Arctic state” with economic ambitions, Japan positions itself as a risk manager and resilience partner.⁴³⁾Government of the Russian Federation (2020) Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2035. Official Internet Portal of Legal Information, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/. Accessed on 30 January 2026; The State Council Information Office of the PRC (2018) Full text: China’s Arctic Policy. The State Council Information Office of the PRC, 26 January, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Accessed on 30 January 2026 This technocratic posture enhances its credibility among Arctic states which tend to welcome actors contributing to collective safety rather than strategic competition. Partnerships with Norway, Iceland, and Canada, along with the co-hosting of the Third Arctic Science Ministerial, demonstrate how Japan’s contributions are perceived as capacity-enhancing and norm-reinforcing.

Japan’s Arctic engagement thus exemplifies how middle powers exercise influence in liminal domains: not by asserting dominance but by performing reliability. Through the stabilization of meaning (resilience), the embedding of norms (routine participation), and the management of vulnerabilities (risk governance), Tokyo has transformed DRR into an instrument of both political and geopolitical legitimacy. Disaster governance, in this sense, becomes diplomacy itself; that is, a repertoire through which Japan converts vulnerability into authority and secures a durable position in the evolving Arctic order.

Conclusion

Japan’s engagement in Arctic DRR demonstrates how middle powers can exercise agency in unsettled governance domains. At first glance, its contributions appear technical. Yet examined through the lens of liminal diplomacy practices, such as provision of satellite data or participation in preparedness exercises, it reveals a strategic logic. In a region marked by climate urgency and intensifying geopolitical rivalry, Japan leverages DRR not simply as a cooperative good but as a vehicle for embedding itself in Arctic governance and projecting an identity of reliability and restraint.

Three mechanisms explain how this agency operates. By consistently framing DRR as a shared priority, Japan stabilizes meaning in a domain where roles and categories remain ambiguous. By repeatedly contributing to Arctic Council working groups such as EPPR, it embeds itself institutionally, transforming observer status into procedural legitimacy. And by offering technological assets and resilience know-how, it participates in collective risk governance. Through these routinized practices, Japan seeks to convert consistency into credibility and influence enacted not through coercion but through the performance of reliability.

Above all, Japan’s Arctic DRR engagement underscores that disaster governance is never neutral. It is a form of diplomacy that stabilizes expectations, builds trust, and performs order in regions where authority remains unsettled. For Japan, thus, DRR functions both as an extension of its domestic resilience identity and as a strategic repertoire of middle-power statecraft; one that allows it to shape the evolving Arctic order from the margins of geography but at the center of governance practice.

Riccardo Villa is an international policy analyst specializing in middle power diplomacy, liminal foreign policy, and multilateral engagement, and global governance institutions. Jakob Ranglin Grissler is a Research Associate at the Institute for Asian Crime and Security, specializing in Japan’s foreign policy and East Asian security affairs.